For as long as the Public Records Act has had a response deadline, a request that arrived at 4:55 on a Friday afternoon cost the agency two of its ten days before anyone read it. Starting January 1, 2027, the weekend no longer counts.
On September 30, 2026, Governor Newsom signed Assembly Bill 1821 (Pacheco; Stats. 2026, ch. 899). The bill amends one section of the California Public Records Act, Government Code section 7922.535, and changes two words in it. The 10 days an agency has to decide whether a request seeks disclosable records become 10 business days, and the 14-day extension available in unusual circumstances becomes 14 business days. The bill has no urgency clause, so it takes effect January 1, 2027.
It is a small amendment with a long list of things it does not do. This post covers what changes, how to count under the new rule, and the obligations and the litigation exposure that stay exactly where they were.
What the bill changes
Section 7922.535 sets the first deadline in every records request. Under subdivision (a) as amended, an agency that receives a request for a copy of records "shall, within 10 business days from receipt of the request, determine whether the request, in whole or in part, seeks copies of disclosable public records in the possession of the agency and shall promptly notify the person making the request of the determination and the reasons therefor." Under subdivision (b), an agency facing unusual circumstances may extend that time by written notice, but the notice "shall not specify a date that would result in an extension for more than 14 business days."
Nothing else in the section moved. The list of unusual circumstances is the same six: records held in field offices or other separate facilities, a voluminous request, the need to consult another agency or another component of the same agency, the need to compile data or write a program to extract it, a cyberattack that cuts the agency off from its servers, and a Governor-proclaimed state of emergency that directly affects the agency's ability to respond.
In practice the first deadline grows from ten days to two weeks, and the outer limit from 24 days to nearly five weeks. A request received on Monday, January 4, 2027, shows the difference:
Determination due. Under the old rule, Thursday, January 14. Under AB 1821, Tuesday, January 19, because the count skips two weekends and the Martin Luther King Jr. holiday.
With the full extension. Under the old rule, Thursday, January 28. Under AB 1821, Monday, February 8.
The Legislature made the two findings the Constitution requires when a statute touches access to public records, and they are the same sentence twice: the act "balances the right of the public to access public records in a timely manner while acknowledging that state and local agencies provide a variety of public services and may need additional time to properly respond to requests." The second is the finding article I, section 3 requires of a statute that "imposes a limitation on the public's right of access." That is a candid description of the bill, and it matters to how a court will read it, as discussed below.
What was taken out along the way
The bill that was signed is much narrower than the bill that was debated. At different points in the session AB 1821 would also have let an agency charge for search time once a request passed two hours, charge search and review fees for "commercial use" requests, petition the superior court for a finding that a request was made with malicious intent, and treat a request as not properly made unless it came in through a channel the agency had designated. Those provisions drew opposition from news organizations, legal aid groups and open-government advocates. None of them survived. The last were removed by amendments on June 25, before the Senate Judiciary Committee heard the bill, and the committee's analysis records that much of the opposition then moved to neutral.
What remained passed the Senate 39 to 0 and the Assembly, on concurrence, 50 to 3. Agencies should not plan around the provisions that did not survive. The fee for a copy is still the direct cost of duplication or a fee set by statute (Gov. Code, § 7922.530, subd. (a)), and a request is still a request however it arrives.
What "business day" means, and what the bill does not say
AB 1821 does not define "business day," and the Public Records Act has no definition of its own. The legislative history is consistent about what was intended. The Assembly floor analysis describes deadlines that under existing law run "without accounting for weekends when most public staff are given leave," and the supporting local government associations wrote that the bill would solve "the issue encountered when weekends and holidays fall within the timeframe" of a request.
That leaves three questions the text does not answer.
Saturdays. The Civil Code's general definition says that every day other than a Sunday or a holiday specified in the Government Code is a business day "for all purposes." (Civ. Code, §§ 7, 9.) Read literally, that definition would count Saturdays. The committee analyses point the other way, and we think a court would follow them, but a requester's lawyer will notice the gap.
Days the agency is closed but the calendar is not. Many cities and districts close on alternating Fridays, or for the week between Christmas and New Year's Day. Nothing in the bill makes those days something other than business days. The conservative reading is that a business day is a weekday that is not a holiday under the Government Code, whether or not a particular agency's counter is open.
Requests already pending on January 1. The bill has no transition clause. An agency that receives a request in late December should assume the calendar-day deadline that applied when the request arrived still governs it.
On each of these the cautious count is the right one, for a reason beyond prudence. A statute that limits the right of access is construed narrowly (Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, subd. (b)(2)), and the Legislature has said in the bill itself that this is such a statute.
What stays the same
The deadline is for a decision, not for an acknowledgment. Within the ten business days the agency must determine whether it has disclosable records, tell the requester so with reasons, and, if records will be produced, "state the estimated date and time when the records will be made available." A letter that says only that the request was received does not meet section 7922.535 on the tenth business day any more than it did on the tenth calendar day. A denial, in whole or in part, must be in writing and must name the people responsible for it. (Gov. Code, § 7922.540.)
The extension still requires a reason and a date. The fourteen business days are available only for the six listed circumstances, "only to the extent reasonably necessary to the proper processing of the particular request," and only by written notice that gives the reason and the date a determination will be sent.
Production is still due "promptly." Section 7922.535 has never set the deadline for handing over the records. That duty is in section 7922.530, which requires the agency to make records "promptly available," and section 7922.500 adds that nothing in the act permits an agency "to delay or obstruct the inspection or copying of public records." In May the Fourth District declined to turn "promptly" into a number of days: "Whether an agency has promptly produced records is to be determined case-by-case considering the scope and burden imposed on the particular agency by the particular request." (Voice of San Diego v. San Diego Unified School Dist. (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 923.) AB 1821 gives agencies more time to make the determination. It gives them no more time to produce.
Other clocks are untouched. Records of police misconduct and serious uses of force must still be provided "at the earliest possible time and no later than 45 days from the date of a request" (Pen. Code, § 832.7, subd. (b)(11)), and the delay permitted for recordings of critical incidents is still measured in calendar days (Gov. Code, § 7923.625). An agency's own sunshine ordinance or records policy, if it promises a faster response than state law, is not amended by AB 1821 either. The act expressly allows agencies to adopt requirements for themselves that give faster access than its minimum standards. (Gov. Code, § 7922.505.)
The exposure for getting it wrong
The more important development on response deadlines this year came from the Supreme Court, not the Legislature. In City of Gilroy v. Superior Court (2026) 19 Cal.5th 38, a legal aid organization sued over the city's handling of requests for police body-camera footage. By the time the case was decided, the city had produced every nonexempt record it still had. The trial court nonetheless issued three declarations: that the city's search had been inadequate, that it had asserted an exemption without reviewing the footage, and that its response to one request "was not timely, occurring 33 days after the request was received," against a maximum of 24. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that a Public Records Act case is moot once the records are produced.
The Supreme Court disagreed. Declaratory relief is available, it held, "[a]t a minimum . . . where the declaration would resolve an ongoing dispute regarding the parties' rights and obligations in a manner that has some likelihood of affecting future requests for public records or future conduct relating to such requests." (Id. at pp. 45–46.) Producing the records after suit is filed no longer ends the case. And a requester who prevails recovers attorney's fees, which the statute makes mandatory. (Gov. Code, § 7923.115, subd. (a).)
The Court was careful about the third declaration, the one about lateness alone. The city had warned that allowing declaratory relief for "some alleged technical violation of the CPRA such as a delayed initial response" would generate suits brought only for fees. The Court answered that its holding "should not threaten the tidal wave of litigation that the City forecasts," and it expressly declined to decide whether a late response, standing by itself, would support an action. (Id. at p. 56.) Justice Groban, joined by two colleagues, wrote separately that the act "does not authorize declaratory relief for the sole purpose of declaring that an agency's past conduct violated the CPRA where there is no evidence of a pattern or practice of violations or where the agency does not dispute its legal obligations."
Read together, the cases draw a line an agency can work with. One determination letter that goes out a day late is unlikely to support a judgment. A practice of late determinations, or a miscounted deadline that the agency defends as correct, is the "ongoing dispute" Gilroy describes, and it is the kind that ends in a fee award. A new counting rule with an undefined term in it is where such a practice could start.
What public agencies should do before January 1
Rewrite the templates. Acknowledgment letters, extension notices, web forms and records portals that say "10 days" or "24 days" should say business days as of January 1, and any software that calculates the due date needs a holiday calendar.
Adopt one way of counting and write it down. Weekdays, excluding Government Code holidays, with the day of receipt not counted. Do not exclude the agency's own closure days without advice.
Keep the December requests on the old clock. A request received on or before December 31 should be answered on the calendar-day deadline.
Check local rules. If a sunshine ordinance, an administrative policy or a settlement promises a response in calendar days, it still does.
Train on what did not change. The determination must still be a determination, the extension must still fit one of the six circumstances, and production is still due promptly. Staff who hear only that "the deadline got longer" will get the rest wrong.
Use the estimated date. The statute requires the determination to state when records will be available. An honest estimate, met or updated, is the best evidence that production was prompt.
For requesters
A business, journalist or resident asking for records after January 1 should expect the first substantive answer in two weeks, not ten days, and should calendar the response date in business days before concluding that it is late. The agency still owes a real determination with reasons and an estimated production date, and still owes the records promptly after that. If the determination says only that the agency is working on it, or the estimated date passes in silence, the remedies are the same as before, and after Gilroy they do not disappear when the records finally arrive.